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The processes of  democratization in Latin America are accompanied by the 
rise of  internationally protected human rights and their respective monito-
ring institutions. The Inter-American System of  Human Rights is one of  
the central bodies in the region. In 2016 and 2017, two requests for advisory 
opinions regarding political trials and impeachment proceedings were pre-
sented before the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights. This article aims 
to verify the reasons invoked by the Court to refrain itself  from issuing the 
two advisory opinions. As of  the theorizations about judicial dialogues, the 
study of  the attributes of  reciprocity and possibility of  divergence points 
to the conclusion that the silence of  the Court regarding democratic set-
backs has a lot to say about the deference granted to its member States. The 
two refusals of  requests of  advisory opinions work as dialogues between 
the Inter-American Court and the States of  the region that face democratic 
challenges. 
Keywords: Inter-American Court of  Human Rights. Advisory Opinions. 
Political trials. Rejections. Judicial dialogues.
Resumo
Os processos de democratização na América Latina são acompanhados pela 
ascensão dos direitos humanos internacionalmente protegidos e seus re-
spectivos organismos de supervisão. O Sistema Interamericano de Direitos 
Humanos é um dos órgãos centrais da região. Em 2016 e 2017, duas soli-
citações de opiniões consultivas sobre juízos políticos e procedimentos de 
impeachment foram apresentadas perante a Corte Interamericana de Direitos 
Humanos. Este artigo objetiva verificar as razões invocadas pela Corte para 
se abster de proferir as duas opiniões consultivas. A partir das teorias sobre 
diálogos judiciais, o estudo dos atributos da reciprocidade e da possibilidade 
de dissenso aponta para a conclusão de que o silêncio da Corte a respeito de 
retrocessos democráticos tem muito a dizer sobre a deferência concedida a 
seus Estados membros. As duas rejeições de elaborar opiniões consultivas 
atuam como diálogos entre a Corte Interamericana e os Estados da região 
que enfrentam desafios democráticos. 
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1 Introduction
“Democracy is the worst form of  Government except 
for all those other forms…”
(W. Churchill)
Democracy is always considered an inseparable ele-
ment for the protection of  human rights. The triad “hu-
man rights, democracy, and the rule of  law” is constan-
tly referred to as the cornerstone of  the humanized and 
contemporary international order. This is the triad that 
accompanies – at least in the contemporary archetype – 
the consolidation of  the juridical conception, national 
and international, of  the protection of  human rights.
Although democracy was a concept that rested wi-
thin the States’ domaine réservé, it became, in the past 
decades, of  extreme importance for the international 
institutions. These spheres are devoting themselves to 
establish international parameters of  ideal democratic 
governments. Raising the rule of  law also to the inter-
national sphere is one of  the great challenges of  the 
contemporary international order.
The Inter-American System of  Human Rights is 
one of  these spheres. Not only the political organisms 
of  the Organization of  American States are challenged 
by governmental changes and democratic ruptures in 
its members States, but the Inter-American Court of  
Human Rights has been invited to comment on the le-
gality (or the lack thereof) of  processes of  destitution 
of  democratically elected Presidents in some countries 
of  the region.
More specifically, two requests for advisory opinions 
regarding political trials were presented before the In-
ter-American Court, one in 2016 and the other in 2017. 
The Court’s reaction was to reject both of  the requests. 
In this sense, the present article aims to study the rea-
sons invoked by the Court to refrain itself  from issuing 
the two advisory opinions.
The lenses of  analysis are judicial dialogues. This 
choice was made to deepen the debate about the re-
fusals of  the Court: they do not simply represent the 
observance of  the criteria established in previous de-
cisions concerning advisory opinions. The subject of  
democracy that is behind the two requests triggers re-
flections about the meaning of  the (apparent) silence of  
the Court concerning the space available for the States 
to decide about political judgments. This is where the 
theorizations about judicial dialogues play an essential 
role since they make clearer that the rejections also re-
late to a non-preponderance of  the Court’s words on 
the matter.
Conceptually, and for the expected purposes, judi-
cial dialogues can be understood as argumentative ex-
changes between different legal orders. Dialogues are 
not restricted to cross-references but refer to mutual 
considerations between the interlocutors. The relations 
between the Inter-American Court and its member Sta-
tes in the scope of  advisory opinions will be studied as 
of  judicial dialogues.
Initially, the advisory jurisdiction of  the Court will 
be detailed in order to provide an understanding of  
the parameters of  acceptance and refusal of  advisory 
opinions. The two requests will be contextualized in re-
lation to the aforementioned parameters. Then, some 
initial thoughts about judicial dialogues will be expo-
sed to demonstrate that dialogues work as method and 
substance for the present article.
In the sequence, the reasons of  the Court that subs-
tantiated the refusals will be verified having judicial dia-
logues as a theoretical reference. Differing from the vast 
majority of  the academic production, which refers to 
the responsiveness of  the States in the exercise of  con-
ventionality control, here, the point of  departure for the 
study of  judicial dialogues is in the opposite direction: 
the Inter-American Court will be put at the center of  
the discussions.
Two attributes of  vertical judicial dialogues will be 
highlighted: reciprocity and the possibility of  diver-
gence. Some reflections about the silence of  the Inter-
-American Court regarding democratic values and the 
deference granted to the member States in the two 
rejections of  requests for advisory opinions will be 
presented. Judicial dialogues will be defended as a ne-
cessary tool to refrain some movements of  democratic 
setbacks in Latin America.

































































































2  Advisory Opinions before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights
Advisory opinions are relevant assets of  internatio-
nal jurisdiction. They were means for the consolidation 
of  international tribunals when they were first establi-
shed and acted as tools to prevent the inaction of  these 
bodies. These opinions can trigger the attention of  a 
court irrespective of  the consent of  the parties that are 
submitted to its jurisdiction. Advisory opinions approa-
ch the most diverse subjects of  International Law and 
their requests, even if  formulated in an abstractive man-
ner, derive from a controversy and the factual situation 
that gives rise to it.1
The Inter-American System of  Human Rights is a 
reflection of  the relevance of  advisory opinions. The 
first decision of  the Inter-American Court of  Human 
Rights (henceforth Inter-American Court or Court) was 
an advisory opinion from 1982. In fact, until the pre-
liminary exceptions’ judgment of  its first contentious 
case, in 19872, the Court had decided on eight of  its 
current twenty-five advisory opinions.3
Article 64 of  the American Convention on Human 
Rights (henceforth American Convention) provides 
that the Inter-American Court is competent to issue ad-
visory opinions regarding (i) the interpretation of  the 
American Convention and other treaties concerning the 
protection of  human rights in the Americas and (ii) the 
compatibility of  any domestic legislation of  a member 
State of  the Organization of  American States (hence-
forth OAS) with the aforementioned instruments.
The same article also determines who is legitimate 
to request an advisory opinion to the Inter-American 
Court: (i) member States of  the OAS and (ii) the organs 
of  the OAS listed in Chapter X of  the Organization’s 
Charter, as well as the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (henceforth Inter-American Commis-
sion). The Rules of  Procedure of  the Court establish 
that when “the advisory opinion is sought by an OAS 
organ other than the Commission; the request shall 
1  RUNAVOT, Marie-Clotilde. La compétence consultative des ju-
ridictions internationales:reflet des vicissitudes de la fonction judiciaire 
internationale. Paris: L.G.D.J., 2010. p. 45-46.
2  IACRHR. Case of  Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Prelimi-
nary objections. Judgment of  June 26th, 1987. Serie C, n. 1.
3  RUNAVOT, Marie-Clotilde. La compétence consultative des ju-
ridictions internationales:reflet des vicissitudes de la fonction judiciaire 
internationale. Paris: L.G.D.J., 2010. p. 38.
also specify how it relates to the sphere of  competence 
of  the organ in question”. Therefore, there must be a 
material connection between the subject of  the request 
and the work of  the organ.4
The reading of  article 64 entails an important con-
clusion: The Inter-American Court is entitled to a broad 
mandate when it comes to the elaboration of  advisory 
opinions. Indeed, the Court disposes of  a wide mate-
rial spectrum of  analysis, confirmed by its first advisory 
opinion, in 1982, which stated that the Court has the 
broadest advisory function ever attributed to an inter-
national court.5 The Court established that it has com-
petence to take into consideration any treaty regarding 
the protection of  human rights applicable to the Ame-
rican States, even if  the treaty has as parties States extra-
neous to the Inter-American System. This also means 
that the Court is not restricted to the Inter-American 
corpus iuris to exercise its advisory function.
A comparison to other international tribunals cor-
roborates this conclusion. The International Court of  
Justice (henceforth ICJ), for instance, may give an ad-
visory opinion “on any legal question”6. However, Sta-
tes are not allowed to request an advisory opinion to 
the ICJ. According to article 96 of  the United Nations 
Charter, the United Nations General Assembly and Se-
curity Council are legitimate to trigger the ICJ’s advisory 
function. Besides, the General Assembly can authorize 
other United Nations organisms and specialized bodies 
to request advisory opinions “arising within the scope 
of  their activities”7. Despite the procedural differences, 
the Inter-American Court’s advisory opinions frequen-
4  Articles 64-69. IACRHR. Rules of  procedure. Approved by 
the Court during its LXXXV Regular Period of  Sessions, held from 
November 16 to 28, 2009. Available at: http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
sitios/reglamento/nov_2009_ing.pdf. Access on: 10 jun. 2019.
5  IACRHR. Other treaties subject to the consultative ju-
risdiction of  the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human 
Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of  September 24, 1982. Series A, n. 
1, paragraph 16.
6  Article 65 of  the Statute of  the International Court of  
Justice. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute. Access on: 
10 jun. 2019.
7  Article 96(2) of  the United Nations Charter. The General 
Assembly authorized four United Nations organisms to request ad-
visory opinions to the ICJ: ECOSOC, Trusteeship Council, Interim 
Committee of  the General Assembly, and Committee on Applica-
tions for Review of  Administrative Tribunals Judgments. Only four 
of  the sixteen specialized agencies authorized to request advisory 
opinions have done so: UNESCO, WHO, FAO, and the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization. In: ICJ. International Court of  Justice: 
































































































tly and explicitly refer to the ICJ’s case law.8
Regarding the European Court of  Human Rights 
(henceforth European Court), Protocol n. 2 of  1963 
to the Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on 
Human Rights) conferred upon the Court competence 
to render advisory opinions. However, the legitimacy to 
present a request and the reach of  the Court’s analysis 
were very restricted: only the Committee of  Ministers 
was legitimate to make the requirement and the advi-
sory opinion could “not deal with any question relating 
to the content or scope of  the rights or freedoms”9 pro-
vided by the Convention and its Protocols, but only to 
the interpretation of  these instruments.
The content of  Protocol n. 2 was endorsed by Pro-
tocol n. 11 of  1994, which modified articles 47 and 48 
of  the European Convention to include the Court’s 
advisory competence.10 One shall notice that the first 
advisory opinion of  the European Court was delivered 
only in 200811, which indicates that the advisory func-
tion is not at the heart of  the European System.
In August 2018, Protocol n. 16 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights entered into force and 
expanded the Court’s advisory competence. It determi-
nes that the highest courts of  the contracting States may 
request the European Court to give advisory opinions 
on questions related to the interpretation or application 
of  the rights defined in the European Convention and 
its protocols. The highest courts are allowed to request 
advisory opinions only in the context of  a pending case 
before them, which demonstrates that the advisory 
function is quite restrict.12
8  RUNAVOT, Marie-Clotilde. La compétence consultative des ju-
ridictions internationales:reflet des vicissitudes de la fonction judiciaire 
internationale. Paris: L.G.D.J., 2010. p. 90.
9 COUNCIL OF EUROPE. Protocol n. 2 to the Convention on the Pro-
tection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Council of  Europe 
Treaty Series n. 44. Strasbourg, 1963. Available at: https://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_Collection_P2_ETS044E_ENG.
pdf. Access on: 10 jun. 2019.
10 COUNCIL OF EUROPE. Protocol n. 11 to the Convention on the 
Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Council of  Eu-
rope Treaty Series n. 155. Strasbourg, 1994. Available at: https://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_Collection_P11_ET-
S155E_ENG.pdf. Access on: 10 jun. 2019.
11 RUNAVOT, Marie-Clotilde. La compétence consultative des juridic-
tions internationales:reflet des vicissitudes de la fonction judiciaire in-
ternationale. Paris: L.G.D.J., 2010. p. 56.
12 COUNCIL OF EUROPE. Protocol n. 16 to the Convention on the 
Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Council of  Eu-
rope Treaty Series n. 214. Strasbourg, 2013. Available at: https://
The Inter-American Court’s advisory function is 
non-litigious and multilateral.13 This means that the de-
cisions might be of  a relevance that encompasses all the 
OAS member States, not relating to any specific factual 
matter. The interpretation given by the Court concer-
ning the human rights protection in the region needs to 
be pertinent to the Inter-American System as a whole, 
reason why the advisory function is abstract in its natu-
re – even if  the request derives from concrete violations 
of  the American Convention.
Neither the American Convention nor the Inter-
-American Court Rules of  Procedure specify the legal 
nature of  the advisory opinions. According to Jorge 
Ernesto Roa14, from the reasoning of  the Court’s de-
cisions it is also impossible to apprehend the binding 
force of  the opinions. The author comments that a ne-
gative definition is plausible: the advisory opinions do 
not have the same effects of  the sentences delivered by 
the Court.
This means that the effects provided by article 68 of  
the American Convention applicable to the sentences 
are not extendable to its advisory opinions: the obliga-
tion of  the States parties to implement the sentence and 
the possibility of  execution of  the sentence through the 
domestic mechanisms opposable to the State (execution 
of  decisions against the State).15 The contours of  the 
binding effects of  the Court’s advisory opinions will be 
discussed in the following section of  this article.
From 1982 to present, the Inter-American Court 
has delivered twenty-five advisory opinions, nineteen of  
which were requested by member States of  the OAS, 
whilst six were required by the Inter-American Com-
mission. In fourteen of  the opinions, the Court dealt 
with the interpretation and application of  human rights 
provisions; in nine occasions, the Court defined and cla-
rified procedural aspects of  the Inter-American System, 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_16_ENG.pdf. Access on: 
10 jun. 2019.
13 ROA, Jorge Ernesto. La función consultiva de la Corte Interamericana 
de Derechos Humanos. Temas de Derecho Público n. 94. Instituto de 
Estudios Constitucionales Carlos Restrepo Piedrahita. Bogotá: Uni-
versidad Externado de Colombia, 2015. p. 64.
14 ROA, Jorge Ernesto. La función consultiva de la Corte Interamericana 
de Derechos Humanos. Temas de Derecho Público n. 94. Instituto de 
Estudios Constitucionales Carlos Restrepo Piedrahita. Bogotá: Uni-
versidad Externado de Colombia, 2015. p. 99.
15 ROA, Jorge Ernesto. La función consultiva de la Corte Interamericana 
de Derechos Humanos. Temas de Derecho Público n. 94. Instituto de 
Estudios Constitucionales Carlos Restrepo Piedrahita. Bogotá: Uni-
































































































mainly the role exercised by the Inter-American Com-
mission; in two of  the advisory opinions, the Court was 
required to analyze the (in)compatibility of  domestic 
legislation with internationally protected human rights.
An interesting aspect of  the consultative function of  
the Inter-American Court is that the American Conven-
tion silences about the possibility of  refusal of  a request 
for an advisory opinion. The Convention only says that 
the Court “may provide” opinions16, adopting a permis-
sible language. However, it does not forbid the Court 
to consider that its advisory function has a facultative 
nature, which means that the Court can answer or not 
such a request.17 Therefore, the Court is allowed to deci-
de, on a discretionary basis, whether to admit or not an 
advisory opinion, as long as it presents justifications.18
In five19 occasions, the Court decided to reject a 
request for an advisory opinion.20 Although the ba-
ckground and the motivations that led to the solicita-
tions are different, the Court has developed some crite-
ria for the acceptance or not of  a request: (i) the petition 
must not cover up a contentious case, nor intend to 
obtain a premature ruling of  the Court over a matter 
that may be submitted before its contentious function; 
(ii) must not be a mechanism for the obtainment of  
an indirect decision of  the Court regarding a domestic 
controversy; (iii) must not be used as an instrument for 
the debate of  domestic political matters; (iv) must not 
16 Article 64.2. IACHR. American Convention on Human Rights. 
Adopted at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human 
Rights. San José, 1969. Available at: https://www.cidh.oas.org/ba-
sicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.htm. Access on: 10 
jun. 2019.
17 PAÚL, Álvaro. Rechazo de solicitudes de opinión consultiva 
por parte de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Revista 
Chilena de Derecho y Ciencia Política, p. 119-131, ene./mayo 2017. p. 
120.
18 ROA, Jorge Ernesto. La función consultiva de la Corte Interamericana 
de Derechos Humanos. Temas de Derecho Público n. 94. Instituto de 
Estudios Constitucionales Carlos Restrepo Piedrahita. Bogotá: Uni-
versidad Externado de Colombia, 2015. p. 70.
19 These five occasions do not include the matter of  Viviana Gal-
lardo and others: IACRHR. In the Matter of  Viviana Gallardo et al. 
Series A. n. 101.
20 IACRHR. Rejection to the Request of  an Advisory Opinion submitted 
by Costa Rica. Order of  May 10th, 2005; IACRHR. Rejection to the Re-
quest of  an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Inter-American Commission 
of  Human Rights. Order of  June 24th, 2005; IACRHR. Rejection to the 
Request of  an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Inter-American Commission 
of  Human Rights. Order of  January 27th, 2009; IACRHR. Rejection to 
the Request of  an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Secretary General of  the 
Organization of  American States. Order of  June, 23rd, 2016; IACRHR. 
Rejection to the Request of  an Advisory Opinion presented by the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission of  Human Rights. Order of  May 29th, 2018.
refer exclusively to subjects already dealt by the Court in 
its case law; (v) must not aim to solve factual questions, 
but to clarify the meaning and purpose of  international 
human rights norms.21
3  Judicial dialogues as method and 
substance
The posture of  the Inter-American Court regarding 
the refusal of  advisory opinions requires an analysis as 
of  the theorizations about judicial dialogues, here un-
derstood in a broader scope than the citation of  judicial 
decisions from (and between) different tribunals.  What 
is proposed is the conception of  dialogues as conversa-
tions between the Inter-American Court and its mem-
ber States, conversations that are not restricted to the 
exchange of  judicial decisions, but that encompass the 
reactions of  one actor towards the other.
According to the classic theory of  Anne-Marie Slau-
ghter, the networks built between different government 
units can lead, in the judiciary branch, to transjudicial 
communications between national and supranational 
courts, with different functions and levels of  recipro-
city.22
These interactions are commonly understood as 
vertical dialogues.23 This verticality is a result of  the 
conventional relationship between the international and 
the national courts due to the international convention 
that bounds them. The literature presents critics to this 
viewpoint, since the verticality usually entails some sort 
of  superiority of  the international court over the natio-
nal institutions24, as if  the international arena always had 
the “last word”.25
21 IACRHR. Rejection to the Request of  an Advisory Opinion submitted 
by the Secretary General of  the Organization of  American States. Order of  
June 23rd, 2016. paragraph 6.
22 SLAUGHTER, Anne-Marie. A typology of  transjudicial com-
munication. University of  Richmond Law Review, v. 29, n. 99, p. 99-137, 
1994. p. 101.
23 For the objectives of  this article, the distinction between vertical 
and horizontal dialogues refers to the existence of  an international 
convention between the tribunals, in the first case, and the absence 
of  it, in the second.
24 BURGORGUE-LARSEN, Laurence. A internacionalização do 
diálogo dos juízes: missiva ao Sr. Bruno Genevois, Presidente do 
Conselho de Estado da França. Prismas: Direito, Políticas Públicas e 
Mundialização, v. 7, n. 1, p. 80, 2010. Availabe at: www.publicacoe-
sacademicas.uniceub.br. Access on: 15 ago. 2016.
































































































When it comes to human rights, an additional chal-
lenge is included: the space left to the States in what 
concerns the protection of  these rights. Until which 
extension are States allowed to build the content of  in-
ternationally protected human rights? This question is 
usually answered with a condition: it depends on the 
degree of  receptivity26 of  the domestic legal orders re-
garding International Human Rights Law, also known 
as “levels of  intensity”.
Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor explains that the hi-
ghest levels of  intensity take place in countries with a 
solid constitutional heritage that incorporates the In-
ter-American corpus iuris in the national legal systems, 
mainly within constitutional States.27 In this sense, for a 
better harmonization28 of  the human rights protection, 
national judges need to apply the standards of  the Inter-
-American System on Human Rights.
This approach of  judicial dialogues is focused on the 
States. The parameters of  analysis aim to investigate the 
responsiveness of  the domestic legal orders regarding 
International Human Rights Law. Therefore, it is pos-
sible to measure – and even classify29 – the responsive 
conducts of  the States in more or less opened to the 
international standards.
Without ignoring the extreme importance of  these 
studies about judicial dialogues, this article proposes a 
different departure for the analysis, having the Inter-
-American Court at the center. As of  the inversion of  
the point of  reference, the reactions of  the Court when 
invited to pronounce itself  on matters related to demo-
cratic setbacks in its member States are studied. The re-
As relações da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos com 
os ordenamentos jurídicos nacionais à luz do caso Fontevecchia e 
D’Amico v. Argentina. In: SILVA, Fernando Quadros da; SARLET, 
Ingo Wolfgang (coord.). Direitos humanos na contemporaneidade. Curiti-
ba: Instituto Memória, 2018.
26 MAC-GREGOR, Eduardo Ferrer. What do we mean when we 
talk about judicial dialogue? Reflections of  a judge of  the Inter-
American Court of  Human Rights. Harvard Human Rights Journal, v. 
30, 2017. p. 110.
27 MAC-GREGOR, Eduardo Ferrer. What do we mean when we 
talk about judicial dialogue? Reflections of  a judge of  the Inter-
American Court of  Human Rights. Harvard Human Rights Journal, v. 
30, 2017. p. 109.
28 MAC-GREGOR, Eduardo Ferrer. What do we mean when we 
talk about judicial dialogue? Reflections of  a judge of  the Inter-
American Court of  Human Rights. Harvard Human Rights Journal, v. 
30, 2017. p. 127.
29 SOLEY, Ximena; STEININGER, Silvia. Parting ways or lashing 
back? Withdrawal, backlash and the Inter-American Court of  Hu-
man Rights. Max Planck Research Paper Series n. 2018-01, p. 1-26, 2018.
jections of  the requests of  the two advisory opinions 
are, in this sense, the starting point.
For the objectives of  this article, two of  these rejec-
tions will be studied, since their substance is related to 
alleged threats to the democratic order in some coun-
tries of  the region.
Unlike the European System that had the insepara-
ble triad of  rule of  law, democracy, and human rights as 
its inspiring source, the Inter-American System has its 
origin in the paradox of  being born in an authoritarian 
environment, which did not allow any direct and im-
mediate association between the aforementioned triad. 
Furthermore, in this context, human rights were tradi-
tionally conceived as an agenda against the State. The 
region still lives with the reminiscences of  the legacy 
of  authoritarian dictatorial regimes, with a culture of  
violence and impunity.
4  Request for advisory opinion from 
May 2016: the impeachment process 
against Dilma Roussef
On May 16th, 2016, a request for an advisory opi-
nion was presented by the Secretary General of  the 
OAS to the Inter-American Court about some aspects 
that could affect the due process guarantees in politi-
cal judgments, more specifically, the impeachment pro-
cess against former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff. 
The solicitation referred to the consequences of  the 
following questions:
(i) the declarations of  the responsible for voting for 
the opening of  an impeachment process that contain 
pre-judgment statements for the condemnation or ac-
quittal or that contain justifications extraneous to the 
cause;
(ii) the recognition, by the same responsible persons, 
of  their submission to instructions that affect their im-
partiality;
(iii) the adoption of  common justifications against 
one public server;
(iv) the indictment for facts that could have been 
practiced before the legal time frame under considera-
tion.
































































































Court about the legality of  the reasons invoked to ini-
tiate a political judgment against President Rousseff, as 
well as the alleged defects that occurred during the ses-
sion of  the Brazilian Deputy’s Chamber that decided 
to authorize the processing of  the impeachment by the 
Senate.
Two interesting observations were made by the In-
ter-American Court in its decision of  refusal to deliver 
the advisory opinion. Firstly, the OAS Secretary Ge-
neral did not individualize the international provisions 
regarding which interpretation was been required. The 
Court preferred to refuse the request based on the me-
rits of  the solicitation, setting aside this formal criterion 
that was not followed.30
Secondly, the Secretary General understood that an 
advisory opinion by the Court would be necessary for 
the application of  article 20 of  the Inter-American De-
mocratic Charter.
The Inter-American Democratic Charter31 was 
adopted in 2001 in recognition of  the Organization’s 
role to promote and consolidate representative demo-
cracy in the region. So far, the Charter has not been ap-
plied to impeachment cases.32 Its article 19 is known as 
a democratic clause33 which establishes that an uncons-
titutional interruption or change in the constitutional 
or democratic regime in a member State constitutes an 
obstacle to its participation in sessions and meetings of  
the Organization’s organisms.
In this sense, article 20 provides that, in such an 
event, any member State or the Secretary General may 
request the convocation of  the Permanent Council of  
the OAS to assess the situation and take the necessary 
measures to restore democracy. If  these diplomatic ac-
tions are not successful, the Permanent Council shall 
convene a special session of  the General Assembly. 
Article 21 of  the Charter establishes that, when 
30 PAÚL, Álvaro. Rechazo de solicitudes de opinión consultiva 
por parte de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Revista 
Chilena de Derecho y Ciencia Política, p. 119-131, ene./mayo 2017. p. 
126.
31 OAS. Inter-american democratic charter. Lima, 2001. Available at: 
https://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm. Ac-
cess on: 10 jun. 2019.
32 BAILLIET, Cecilia M. The strategic prudence of  the Inter-
American Court of  Human Rights: rejection of  requests for an ad-
visory opinion. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 15, n. 1, p. 
254-276, 2018. p. 274.
33 This democratic clause was accorded by the OAS member States 
in the Declaration of  Quebec City of  April 2001.
there has been an unconstitutional interruption of  the 
democratic order of  a member State, and the diploma-
tic initiatives have failed, the special session can decide 
to suspend this State from the exercise of  its right to 
participate in the OAS. Affirmative votes of  two-thirds 
of  the OAS member States are necessary for the sus-
pension, which takes effect immediately. The article also 
determines that the suspended State shall continue to 
comply with its obligations as an OAS member, in par-
ticular regarding human rights.
The Court stated that the faculty provided by article 
20 of  the Democratic Charter can be exercised by the 
OAS Secretary General in a discretionary basis accor-
ding to his evaluation of  the situation. This faculty is 
beyond the Court’s advisory function and was not deci-
sive to the rejection.34
The fact that the impeachment process against Pre-
sident Rousseff  was still under consideration by the 
Brazilian Senate led the Inter-American Court to deci-
de that, if  it elaborated an advisory opinion, it would 
constitute a premature analysis of  a matter that could 
be brought before its contentious jurisdiction, especially 
because the issue was not domestically concluded.35
Theorizations about judicial dialogues reveal that 
this argument of  the Court was not a simple repetition 
of  the reasoning of  its previous decisions. Whether 
vertical or horizontal, dialogues presuppose a genuine 
exchange between the interlocutors. Without this con-
fluence of  ideas, the conversations are one-sided. This 
attribute of  dialogues can be named as reciprocity36 and 
requires a proper response from one organ in relation 
to the other.
In the two advisory opinions, the Court was urged 
to manifest itself  about a delicate subject, since “impea-
chment is a marker of  institutional instability and inter-
-branch conflict.”37 Therefore, a detailed look at some 
of  the questions presented before the Court allows one 
34 IACRHR. Order of  June 23rd, 2016, paragraph 8.
35 IACRHR. Order of  June 23rd, 2016, paragraph 7.
36 NOWAK, Bruna. Entre diálogos e monólogos: um estudo sobre as 
referências da Corte Internacional de Justiça à jurisprudência das 
cortes regionais de direitos humanos. 2018. 209 f. Dissertação 
(Mestrado em Direito) – Faculdade de Direito, Universidade Federal 
do Paraná, Curitiba, 2018. f. 45-47.
37 BAILLIET, Cecilia M. The strategic prudence of  the Inter-
American Court of  Human Rights: rejection of  requests for an ad-
visory opinion. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 15, n. 1, p. 
































































































to conclude that, indeed, an advisory opinion was not 
the most suited sphere for the required answers. For 
instance, how could the Court decide about the legality 
of  the reasons invoked to initiate a political judgment 
against former President Rousseff?
In this sense, what is important to consider about 
reciprocity is that it entails the confluence of  ideas be-
tween the interlocutors. In the present situation, the 
Inter-American Court considered the States able to bet-
ter contribute to the solution of  these questions. The 
ideal scenario would be an interaction between the le-
gal orders: the States’ courts using the decisions of  the 
Inter-American Court of  Human Rights as parameters 
to define the contours of  political trials.
As the Inter-American Court has given the first 
steps into this direction, a response from the States is 
expected. This behavior would constitute a genuine dia-
logue between the two legal orders, especially when one 
considers the sensitivity of  the subjects involving im-
peachment proceedings. This analysis will continue in 
the second refusal of  a request for an advisory opinion.
5  Request for advisory opinion from 
October 2017: the guarantees of due 
process in impeachment proceedings
On October 13th, 2017, the Inter-American Com-
mission requested an advisory opinion to the Inter-
-American Court about the guarantees of  due process 
and the principle of  legality in the context of  impeach-
ment proceedings against constitutional and democrati-
cally elected presidents, as well as the potential implica-
tions the arbitrary use of  this mechanism entails to the 
exercise of  human rights.38
One peculiar aspect of  this case is that the Court 
had firstly initiated the proceedings and allowed the pre-
sentation of  amicus curiae briefs. The suspension of  the 
processing of  the request happened later, and the Court 
established that it has the authority to decree the sus-
pension at any time.
Indeed, the declaration of  inadmissibility of  an advi-
sory opinion can take place in two different procedural 
moments: before or after the Court observes article 73.1 
38 IACRHR. Order of  June 23rd, 2016, paragraph 3.
of  its Rules of  Procedure, which establishes that it must 
send a copy of  the request to all of  the OAS member 
States, the Inter-American Commission and other OAS 
organisms, so they can present written observations.39
The Court had already adopted this behavior – of  
issuing the decision of  inadmissibility after the applica-
tion of  article 73.1 of  the Rules of  Procedure – in two 
previous requests of  advisory opinion, one regarding 
the compatibility of  a legislative amendment in Costa 
Rica in relation to article 8 of  the American Conven-
tion40, and the other about the compatibility of  the 
Convention with measures that denied access to appeals 
in cases concerning death penalty41.
In the first decision, the Court understood that if  
it answered the request, it “could in the long run in-
terfere with cases that should be fully processed by the 
Commission”42. In the second decision, the Court re-
ceived observations from States and organizations that 
opposed to the admissibility of  the request. The Court 
considered that it had already decided on the imposition 
of  the death penalty and its implementation in conten-
tious and advisory cases.
Considering this background, the Inter-American 
Court indicated that the Inter-American Commission 
was processing three individual petitions about politi-
cal judgments: alleged human rights violations against 
Manuel Zelaya in the context of  the coup d’état in 
Honduras; against Fernando Lugo in the context of  
the impeachment proceedings in Paraguay; and against 
President Rousseff. Again, the Court understood that 
delivering an advisory opinion would correspond to a 
premature decision on cases being processed before its 
contentious jurisdiction.43
The Court affirmed that the provisions about im-
peachment proceedings and political trials substantially 
vary among the Constitutions of  the OAS member Sta-
39 PAÚL, Álvaro. Rechazo de solicitudes de opinión consultiva 
por parte de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Revista 
Chilena de Derecho y Ciencia Política, p. 119-131, ene./mayo 2017. p. 
127.
40 IACRHR. Compatibility of  draft legislation with Article 8.2.h 
of  the American Convention on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion 
OC-12/91 of  December 6, 1991. Series A, n. 12.
41 IACRHR. Request for an advisory opinion presented by the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights. Order of  the Inter-American Court 
of  Human Rights of  June 24, 2005.
42 IACRHR. Advisory Opinion OC-12/91 of  December 6, 1991. para-
graph 29.
































































































tes. In this sense, it would be “very difficult to reduce 
the Inter-American standards to a minimum common 
denominator in order to respond to the questions posed 
by the Commission”44.
In the light of  the attribute of  reciprocity, this ar-
gument demonstrates that one interlocutor needs to 
take the other as reference, in order to “recognize the 
importance of  the institution considered as a [decisio-
nal] parameter and the contributions that come from 
it”45. In the present two cases, the Inter-American Court 
made expressed reference to the Latin-American con-
text about political trials, specifying that the diversity 
of  the legal orders was an obstacle to the delivery of  a 
complete and coherent advisory opinion.
It is interesting to observe that the Court proposed a 
(hardly achievable) criterion to analyze requests of  advi-
sory opinions, in order to find a balance between mere 
abstractions and factual matters:
Nevertheless, requests for an advisory opinion 
should not be so specific that they involve deciding 
a contentious case in disguise, or the prejudgment 
of  specific situations. Thus, the goal is to achieve 
the difficult balance between the legitimate interests 
of  the party requesting the opinion and the general 
purpose of  the advisory function.46
Again, theorizations about dialogues explain the In-
ter-American Court’s approach, since this balance can 
be better achieved through reciprocity, in the sense that 
the Court shall give more weight to the reasons invoked 
by the requesting part of  an advisory opinion, as well 
as to the extension of  the effects the advisory opinion 
might achieve.
The recognition of  the legitimate interests behind 
the proposition of  a request for an advisory opinion 
reinforces the richness of  judicial dialogues. Even if  the 
Court decides to abstain from giving an answer – which 
is exactly the scenario –, considering the particularities 
the interlocutor is fundamental to establish the con-
fluence of  arguments triggered by dialogues. Reciproci-
44 IACRHR. Order of  May 29th, 2018, paragraph14.
45 Tradução livre. “Dialogar, mais do que tomar emprestadas 
sentenças de outra instância ou responder timidamente a estes 
empréstimos, significa reconhecer a importância da instituição de 
que se vale como parâmetro e as contribuições dela advindas”. In: 
NOWAK, Bruna. Entre diálogos e monólogos: um estudo sobre as refer-
ências da Corte Internacional de Justiça à jurisprudência das cortes 
regionais de direitos humanos. 2018. 209 f. Dissertação (Mestrado 
em Direito) – Faculdade de Direito, Universidade Federal do Paraná, 
Curitiba, 2018. f. 46.
46 IACRHR. Order of  May 29th, 2018, paragraph 9.
ty means not only opening the floor to the interlocutor 
but also taking into account the diversity and plurality 
of  ideas that come from this connection.
The Court then concluded that the wording of  the 
request it received was not compatible to this balance, 
because the Commission referred to “possible distor-
tions of  the impeachment mechanism” that could entail 
a “parliamentary coup d’état.47 The request was too clo-
se to factual situations.
An interesting feature is that, if  the Court were wi-
lling to, if  could have used an asset to revert the (alle-
gedly) excessively factual request and elaborate the ad-
visory opinion. In paragraph 17 of  the Order of  May 
29th, 2018, the Court declares that:
17. Based on the above, the Court finds that, by 
responding to the Inter-American Commission’s 
questions as they are worded – that is, developing 
abstract considerations on the compatibility of  
the numerous models of  impeachment – it could 
not sufficiently examine the particularities of  the 
institutional design of  the different horizontal 
control mechanisms that exist in the region.
The Court affirms that the examination of  the In-
ter-American Commission’s questions “as they were 
worded” would result in “abstract considerations on 
the compatibility of  the numerous models of  impeach-
ment”. In order to avoid abstractions, the Court decided 
to overrule the request, aiming to preserve the “par-
ticularities of  the institutional design of  the different 
horizontal control mechanisms that exist in the region”.
What the court decided to omit is the possibility – 
established by its own case law – it has to change the 
wording of  the questions presented before it. Jorge 
Ernesto Roa adduces that the entities that consult the 
Court through its advisory function carry the respon-
sibility to present their requests with clarity. Since this 
scenario does not always occur, the Court has decided 
that within its competence is the authority to reformula-
te the questions that compose the requests of  advisory 
opinions. The Inter-American Court so determined in 
its Advisory Opinion nº 7 of  1986, designating that it 
can interpret, clarify, and redefine the questions propo-
sed before it.48
47 IACRHR. Order of  May 29th, 2018,paragraph 13.
48 ROA, Jorge Ernesto. La función consultiva de la Corte Interamericana 
de Derechos Humanos. Temas de Derecho Público n. 94. Instituto de 
Estudios Constitucionales Carlos Restrepo Piedrahita. Bogotá: Uni-
































































































For instance, in the most recent advisory opinion 
elaborated by the Court, nº 25 of  2018, it affirmed that 
the questions presented by the State of  Ecuador con-
tained factual issues. For this reason, the Court recalled 
that its advisory function constitutes a service in favor 
of  all the Inter-American States. It decided that it could 
not respond the request in the exact terms proposed, 
since the questions did not refer exclusively to questions 
of  interpretation of  human rights treaties and required 
the definition of  factual background.49 The Court re-
formulated the questions in order to properly formulate 
the advisory opinion.
The Court’s decision not to use this faculty in the 
two requests under consideration was a discretionary 
choice. In the context of  judicial dialogues, this omis-
sion is not a total silence of  the Court. It was a strategic 
move that corroborated the non-delivery of  the advi-
sory opinions. If  it wanted, the Court could have pre-
sented contrapositions to the questions and proposed a 
more adequate wording for the exercise of  its advisory 
function.
In this sense, it is important to highlight that the 
contraposition of  ideas is not an opposition to dialo-
gues. Dialogues do not necessary produce consonance; 
they are also able to create dissonance.50 In fact, if  dia-
logues were meant only to generate agreement, a lot of  
potential would be lost.51 Dialogical relations between 
different actors, especially tribunals, can entail an “in-
formative discordance”, which means that the final di-
sagreement will be a product of  reflection and conside-
ration of  the position rejected.
49 IACRHR. The institution of  asylum, and its recognition as a 
human right under the Inter-American System of  Protection (inter-
pretation and scope of  Articles 5, 22(7) and 22(8) in relation to Ar-
ticle 1(1) of  the American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory 
Opinion OC 25/18 of  May 30th, 2018. Series A, n. 25, paragraph 54.
50 NOWAK, Bruna. Entre diálogos e monólogos: um estudo sobre as 
referências da Corte Internacional de Justiça à jurisprudência das 
cortes regionais de direitos humanos. 2018. 209 f. Dissertação 
(Mestrado em Direito) – Faculdade de Direito, Universidade Federal 
do Paraná, Curitiba, 2018. f. 50.
51 Aristoteles Constantinides comments that the search for coher-
ence might not ignore other values, such as the potential that comes 
from divergences and that makes the decision-making process less 
restrict to the particularities from where the decision is taken. In: 
CONSTANTINIDES, Aristoteles. Transjudicial dialogue and con-
sistency in human rights jurisprudence: a case study on diplomatic 
assurances against torture. In: FAUCHALD, Ole Kristian; NOLL-
KAEMPER, André (ed.). The practice of  international and national courts 
and the (de-)fragmentation of  international law. Oregon: Hart Publishing, 
2012. p. 273-274.
Substantially speaking, what the Court could have 
said, but decided not to, is that it has the duty not to 
interfere in domestic political issues. This would cons-
titute a cautious move in line with a dialogical behavior. 
However, the Court opted to expose justifications in 
consonance to its previous decisions of  refusal of  advi-
sory opinions. In the language of  judicial dialogues, this 
omission is not a simple passive posture of  the Court. 
The Court’s refusals were not a mere “no”: behind the 
apparent silence, there is much that can be apprehen-
ded. The refusal does not make the Court “mute”52 
about the subject, as will be further explained.
What can be seen from the above is that the occa-
sions in which the Inter-American Court chose to si-
lence tell a great deal about the organism’s cosmology 
about its own advisory jurisdiction and on what terms it 
should be delineated.
The justifications presented by the Court in both of  
the decisions resonate in relation to the theorizations 
about judicial dialogues. They are a sign of  reciprocity, 
in the sense that the Inter-American Court recognized 
that the States were the best arena for the discussions. 
This recognition was only possible because the domes-
tic legal orders were taken into account; otherwise, there 
would be no reciprocity: the Court would have simply 
rejected the requests – as it is allowed to do.
As the theorizations about judicial dialogues add li-
ght to some specific contours of  the Court’s two de-
cisions and demonstrate that there was more than a 
simply refusal to comment on democracy in the region, 
extra comments are necessary when one verifies that 
the Court has an expansive posture regarding its advi-
sory function.
6  Expansiveness and deference: a 
space for dialogues
As seen in the first section of  this article, the effects 
and limits of  the Inter-American Court’s advisory func-
52 “The main feature of  dialogue is the necessity for an exchange 
of  ideas between those engaged init; otherwise it is rather a mono-
logue”. In: TZANAKOPOULOS, Antonios. Judicial dialogue in 
multilevel governance: the impact of  the Solange argument. In: 
FAUCHALD, Ole Kristian; NOLLKAEMPER, André (ed.). The 
practice of  international and national courts and the (de-)fragmentation on in-
































































































tion are blurry. What can be observed is continuous 
expansion in the exercise of  this function. The Court 
has constantly mentioned that the effects of  its advi-
sory opinions are undeniable53, even if  they differ from 
the binding nature of  its sentences. According to Ma-
rie-Clotilde Runavot, the absence of  a mandatory legal 
force does not entail the practical inutility or the illusory 
character of  advisory opinions.54
If, in the beginning of  the exercise of  its jurisdiction, 
the Court answered requests about procedural aspects 
of  the Inter-American System, in the past few years 
(more precisely since 2014), the Court has come across 
requests related to substantial matters of  International 
Human Rights Law. Just like the two requests that were 
refused, the Court has received other solicitations that 
were long, more complex, and referred to the interpre-
tation and application of  human rights norms.
For example, in the Advisory Opinion nº 21 of  
201455, the Court pronounced itself  about the States’ 
international obligations regarding the rights of  chil-
dren in the context of  migration. In order to properly 
respond to the request, the Court not only searched for 
the meaning and purpose of  the international norms, 
but aimed to instigate States to implement their obliga-
tions and adopt human rights public policies about the 
subject. The scope of  advisory opinions is, therefore, to 
strengthen the Inter-American System for human rights 
protection in a manner compatible with the interests of  
justice.56
An important commentary was made by the Court 
in this advisory opinion. It recognized that the obliga-
tions identified by the Court about children in migra-
tory processes are complex and changing in the present 
times. For this reason, they must be understood as part 
of  the “progressive development of  International Hu-
53 IACRHR. Reports of  the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (Art. 51 American Convention on Human Rights). 
Advisory Opinion OC-15/97 of  November 14, 1997. Series A, n. 15, 
paragraph 26.
54 Translation by the authors. In the original: «’absence de force 
juridique obligatoire de tout acte consultatif  n’implique donc pas 
forcément son inutilité pratique ou de caractère illusoire». RU-
NAVOT, Marie-Clotilde. La compétence consultative des juridictions 
internationales:reflet des vicissitudes de la fonction judiciaire interna-
tionale. Paris: L.G.D.J., 2010. p. 52.
55 IACRHR. Rights and guarantees of  children in the context of  
migration and/or in need of  international protection. Advisory Opin-
ion OC 21/14 of  August 19th, 2014. Series A, n. 21.
56 IACRHR. Advisory Opinion OC 21/14 of  August 19th, 2014. para-
graphs 28-29.
man Rights Law”57. For Cecilia Bailliet, this practice 
reveals “the deliberative use of  advisory opinions to 
strengthen the normative evolution of  human rights 
law”. According to the author, “these [expansive] cases 
are balanced by the Court’s parallel rejection of  requests 
which address certain political cases and pragmatically 
signal deference to States”58.
In the Advisory Opinion nº 25 of  2018, the Court 
interpreted some articles of  the American Convention 
to define the content of  the institution of  asylum as 
a human right. The Court concluded that, whilst there 
are precise obligations regarding the right to territorial 
asylum, there is no customary rule (not even a regional 
one) about the right to diplomatic asylum.59
The development of  the Court’s advisory function 
points to an expansion (vis expansiva) of  this competen-
ce, mainly in what concerns the reach of  the decisions.60 
The Court not only defines the content of  rights: it also 
specifies the States’ international obligations and consi-
ders the entire international human rights regime, not 
confining itself  to the Inter-American corpus iuris. The 
Court’s advisory opinions play an important role in the 
development of  International Human Rights Law as of  
the American region.
This vis expansiva has a special nuance in the Inter-
-American System. Latin America is characterized by a 
high degree of  social exclusion and inequality to which 
democracies in the consolidation phase are added.  It is 
in this scenario that the System legitimizes itself  as an 
important and effective instrument for the protection 
of  human rights when national institutions prove to be 
failures or omissions. This is why the Court has a wide 
repertoire of  strengthening the rule of  law in the region.
When compared to this expansiveness, can the two 
decisions of  refusal to present advisory opinions be un-
57 IACRHR. Advisory Opinion OC 21/14 of  August 19th, 2014. para-
graph 14 of  the concluding remarks.
58 BAILLIET, Cecilia M. The strategic prudence of  the Inter-
American Court of  Human Rights: rejection of  requests for an ad-
visory opinion. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 15, n. 1, p. 
254-276, 2018. p. 262.
59 IACRHR. The institution of  asylum, and its recognition as a human 
right under the Inter-American System of  Protection (interpretation and 
scope of  Articles 5, 22(7) and 22(8) in relation to Article 1(1) of  the 
American Convention on Human Rights).
60 ROA, Jorge Ernesto. La función consultiva de la Corte Interamericana 
de Derechos Humanos. Temas de Derecho Público n. 94. Instituto de 
Estudios Constitucionales Carlos Restrepo Piedrahita. Bogotá: Uni-
































































































derstood as a movement in the opposite direction since 
the Court decided to restrain itself ? What can be ap-
prehended from the present analysis is an opposition 
between the Court’s expansive posture and the space 
of  deference that was given to the member States in the 
two cases under appreciation.
Deference is an attribute constantly required from 
the Inter-American Court. In the words of  Jorge Con-
tesse, “it may be time to reconsider the system’s reluc-
tance toward subsidiarity as a principle of  international 
adjudication”61. The author sustains that a more colla-
borationist model would help the enforcement of  In-
ternational Human Rights Law, since it would grant Sta-
tes “some say regarding the protection of  human rights, 
as the Court has timidly done recently”62.
Acting in a subsidiary way was a conscious choice 
made by the Court in both of  the advisory opinions 
about political judgments. If  the Court wished, it could 
have given a more assertive response to the requests. 
It could also have answered both of  them, whether it 
decided to reformulate the questions or not. Any of  the 
aforementioned behaviors would be justified by the dis-
cretionary powers and the principle of compétence de la 
compétence.
It is important to note that the incisive decisions 
taken by the Inter-American Court are, mostly, well 
grounded on international parameters of  human rights’ 
protection. For instance, the Court has a consolidated 
(contentious) case law regarding the principle of  le-
gality in the context of  deprivation of  liberty.63 In the 
advisory opinions, the Court has developed deep and 
complete analysis on subjects regulated under Interna-
tional Human Rights Law, such as the protection of  the 
environment, gender equality, migration, and the right 
to asylum. In these occasions, the Court has established 
dialogues with other systems for the protections of  hu-
man rights, mainly the United Nations and the Euro-
pean Court of  Human Rights.
61 CONTESSE, Jorge. Subsidiarity in inter-american human rights law. 
p. 25. Available at: https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/
pdf/SELA15_Contesse_CV_Eng.pdf. Access on: 30 jun. 2019.
62 CONTESSE, Jorge. Contestation and deference in the Inter-
American Human Rights System. Law and Contemporary Problems, v. 
79, n. 2, p. 123-145, 2016. p. 144.
63 IACHR. Informe sobre los Derechos Humanos de las Personas Priva-
das de Libertad en las Américas. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 64. 31 dez. 
2011. Available at: http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/ppl/docs/pdf/
PPL2011esp.pdf. Access on: 07 jul. 2019.
There would not be the same robust international le-
gal background for the Court to decide on political trials 
and impeachment processes. Therefore, the deferential 
approach can also be understood because of  the lack of  
decisional parameters. However, one cannot forget that 
the Inter-American Court is not a soloist when it comes 
to facing political cases. The ICJ, in the exercise of  its 
advisory jurisdiction, has delivered decisions on highly 
political issues.
For instance, in the advisory opinion about Kosovo’s 
declaration of  independence64, the ICJ stated that the 
political aspect of  a question is not sufficient to deprive 
it of  its legal character, nor it leads the Court to refuse 
to respond to the request:
Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot 
refuse to respond to the legal elements of  a question 
which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial 
task, namely, in the present case, an assessment 
of  an act by reference to international law. The 
Court has also made clear that, in determining 
the jurisdictional issue of  whether it is confronted 
with a legal question, it is not concerned with the 
political nature of  the motives which may have 
inspired the request or the political implications 
which its opinion might have.65
In the opinion about the construction of  a wall in 
the occupied Palestinian territory66, the ICJ has gone 
beyond the original request – the possible internatio-
nal responsibility of  Israel for violating International 
Law – and extended the analysis to the responsibility 
of  the United Nations and other States. More recently, 
in the opinion concerning the Chagos Islands, in whi-
ch the right to self-determination was reaffirmed, the 
Court decided a highly political and sensitive question 
and concluded that “the United Kingdom is under an 
obligation to bring to an end its administration of  the 
Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible”67.
64 ICJ. Accordance with international law of  the unilateral dec-
laration of  independence in respect of  Kosovo. Advisory Opin-
ion of  22nd July 2010. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/files/
caserelated/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf. Access on: 08 
apr. 2020.
65 ICJ. Accordance with international law of  the unilateral declara-
tion of  independence in respect of  Kosovo. Advisory Opinion of  22nd 
July 2010. paragraph 27. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/files/
caserelated/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf. Access on: 08 
apr. 2020. 
66 ICJ. Legal consequences of  the construction of  a wall in the 
occupied palestinian territory. Advisory Opinion of  9th July 2004. 
Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/131/131-
20040709-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf. Access on: 08 apr. 2020.
67 ICJ. Legal consequences of  the separation of  the Chagos 
































































































These brief  mentions of  the ICJ’s decisions highli-
ght the concrete, factual, and political origins of  its ad-
visory opinions and show that the Court, unlike the In-
ter-American, usually chooses to decide on the matters.
Besides, the Inter-American System ordinary ap-
proach towards democratic ruptures in its member 
States takes place through the annual report of  the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Cuba 
and Venezuela lead the list of  the countries included in 
Chapter IV of  the report, which focuses on examining 
the countries that face adversary contexts in the pro-
tection of  human rights or a rupture in its democratic 
institutions. In addition, there are the mechanisms pro-
vided by articles 19 to 21 of  the Inter-American De-
mocratic Charter, which, as seen, can culminate in the 
suspension of  member States.68
The Court’s vis expansiva also leads to another ob-
servation. As seen, the advisory opinions of  the Inter-
-American Court have been contributing to the de-
velopment of  International Human Rights Law. The 
assertiveness of  the Court’s pronouncements has the 
potential to generate effects extra-system, in the sense 
that it can impact the normative evolution of  interna-
tionally protected human rights outside the Inter-Ame-
rican boundaries. However, the intra-system effects 
remain limited because the robustness of  the advisory 
opinion does not necessarily trigger more compliance 
by the member States69: at most, “they are considered 
to encourage rather than compel state compliance”70.
ruary of  2019. Available at: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/169/169-20190225-01-00-EN.pdf. Access on: 08 apr. 2020.
68 CERQUEIRA, Daniel. Impericia jurídica, insolencia histórica e 
incoherencia diplomática: al propósito del manotazo de cinco países 
de Sudamérica al Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. 
Justicia en las Américas: blog de la Fundación para el Debido Proceso, 
May 3rd, 2019. Available at: https://dplfblog.com/2019/05/03/im-
pericia-juridica-insolencia-historica-e-incoherencia-diplomatica-a-
proposito-del-manotazo-de-cinco-paises-de-sudamerica-al-sistema-
interamericano-de-derechos-humanos/. Access on: 20 jun. 2019.
69 For Jorge Roa, “Un presupuesto del cumplimiento o incumplim-
iento de una obligación consiste en estar vinculado por la fuente 
donde se encuentra establecido el deber o la obligación. En el caso 
de las opiniones consultivas, las fisuras de indeterminación de los efectos y 
ampliación de la competencia no permiten afirmar con total certeza que 
los estándares de protección de los derechos humanos establecidos 
en las decisiones consultivas son de obligatorio cumplimiento para 
los Estados que hacen parte del Sistema Interamericano”. In: ROA, 
Jorge Ernesto. La función consultiva de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos. Temas de Derecho Público n. 94. Instituto de Estudios 
Constitucionales Carlos Restrepo Piedrahita. Bogotá: Universidad 
Externado de Colombia, 2015. p. 122.
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This means that even if  the Court had decided to 
write the two advisory opinions, they would probably 
not refrain the democratic setbacks that are taking place 
in some countries. Therefore, it is possible to approxi-
mate the Court’s decision “not to decide” to the strate-
gic litigation that characterizes its contentious jurisdic-
tion, in the sense that only the relevant cases capable of  
impacting the Latin-American region are taken before 
and decided by the Court.
As one can conclude, behind the deference given to 
the States is a much more complex decisional rationa-
lity adopted by the Inter-American Court. Besides the 
peculiarities of  the advisory jurisdiction, the subject of  
democratic ruptures is a challenging one. The intercon-
nection between human rights and democracy is not 
new, and although it is reaffirmed at various times in the 
contemporary protection of  these, it is reminiscent of  
the category’s own modern heritage. Therefore, demo-
cracy remains indispensable, even if  the Court decides 
not to talk about it.
7 Conclusion
The notion of  human rights has, since its liberal 
enunciation, been deeply related to political power, ei-
ther in the liberal order with the concern of  limiting the 
State through the guarantee of  rights and separation of  
powers, either in the social order as a gauge of  the legi-
timacy of  the political power, based on the realization 
of  rights.
From its modern normative origin, human rights 
have a strong connection with the political field and 
with the democratic regime since they are located in the 
intersection of  the political relations of  power and do-
mination in the society.
These rights are in the dynamics of  relations of  con-
temporary political power, and are, at the same time, 
guarantee and instrument of  the democratic principle 
in securing the necessary conditions for its exercise. 
Human rights integrate the entire State legal system as 
a material foundation, thus functioning as elements of  
the legitimacy of  the political-legal order.
American Court of  Human Rights: rejection of  requests for an ad-
visory opinion. Revista de Direito Internacional, Brasília, v. 15, n. 1, p. 
































































































Democracy, both nationally and internationally, 
appears as a joint and inseparable condition for the pro-
tection of  human rights.
Inspired by this conviction, the Inter-American 
Court rejected two requests for advisory opinions on 
political trials presented before it, one in 2016 (about 
former President Dilma Roussef ’s impeachment) and 
the other in 2017 (about the guarantees of  due process 
and the principle of  legality in the context of  impeach-
ment proceedings against constitutional and democrati-
cally elected presidents), refraining itself  from issuing a 
viewpoint on the matters.
As previously stated, the silence says a lot, especially 
about the Court’s advisory jurisdiction and vision about 
its mandate to defend human rights and, by consequen-
ce, democracy in our region.
These rejections work as dialogues between the In-
ter-American Court and its member States. By opting to 
“say nothing”, the Inter-American System is actually en-
tailing a conversation with its member States that is not 
restricted to the exchange of  judicial decisions, but that 
encompass the dynamics of  reciprocity and deference. 
The omissions of  the Court are nothing but strategic 
and coherent to its previous decisions of  rejection of  
requests of  advisory opinions.
Even though the development of  the Court’s advi-
sory function points to an expansion (vis expansiva) of  
this competence, the two decisions of  refusal to present 
advisory opinions can be understood as a posture of  
deference that was given to the member States. These 
dialogues can do more for democracy in the Latin Ame-
rican region than top-down advisory opinions that put 
the States as enemies of  the System.
Besides, having the Court at the center of  the discus-
sion enlightens that it also intended to avoid a possible 
instrumentalization of  its advisory competence: answe-
ring contentious cases in disguise without the consent 
of  the parties. In exercising its advisory function, the 
Inter-American Court cannot interfere, alter or distort 
its contentious function. However, as seen, this line is 
tenuous.
Political trials can serve democracy or be prejudicial 
to it. The two requests of  advisory opinions sought a 
criterion to assess situations in which these judgments 
are validly exercised and when they are improperly used. 
The Court’s response, read in the light of  the theoriza-
tions regarding judicial dialogues, points to the need for 
comparative analysis. This dialogical exercise could lead 
to conclusions about how judicial control might not im-
ply a risk to the separation of  powers and the system of  
checks and balances and what safeguards there could be 
to prevent the use of  political judgments in the form of  
a covered-up coup d’etat.
Through dialogues, reciprocity and deference can 
have better results in democracy and human rights prac-
tices in the region.
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